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SHOULD CONGRESS PASS LEGISLATION
RESTORING THE BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION?
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL*
Throughout the last 200 years, courts have predominantly
used two approaches to analyze questions of religious liberty.
Both of these approaches have important precursors in Ameri-
can tradition and both were used in early state court decisions.
Each approach has had noble defenders on both sides of the
political spectrum.
The first approach treats the Free Exercise Clause' of the
First Amendment as a guarantee that the government will not
direct any of its legislation specifically against the practice of a
religion. In other words, the government is forbidden from sin-
gling out any one religion or making a religious practice the
object of its legislation. Those who adhere to this approach
view the First Amendment simply as a religious anti-discrimina-
tion provision.2
The other predominant approach to the question of religious
liberty posits that all citizens are entitled to practice religion to
the maximum extent possible, consistent with the maintenance
of the peace and safety of the state.' This formulation, which
parallels the wording of many early state constitutions,4 sounds
somewhat old-fashioned today. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has expounded this view in more modern terms by stat-
ing that a burden on the free exercise of religion is constitu-
tional only if there is a compelling governmental interest that
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"). The first clause is referred to as
the Establishment Clause; the second is the Free Exercise Clause. Both of the Religion
Clauses have been made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exer-
cise Clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause).
2. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court'" Kurland Revis-
ited, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373.
3. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that
freedom of religion is susceptible to restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests that the state may lawfully protect).
4. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of these state
constitutions.
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justifies that burden. 5
Because these definitions are exceedingly abstract, a few ex-
amples are necessary to demonstrate how these approaches af-
fect real life situations. All of these examples involve generally
applicable laws that were enacted for valid reasons and are gen-
erally constitutional. In the minds of the drafters, these laws
have nothing to do with religion. Nevertheless, as applied to
certain religions in specific circumstances, the laws have the ef-
fect of limiting the free exercise of religion.
For example, laws that prohibit discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of gender are generally applicable and not
directed at religion. They can significantly intrude on the free
exercise of religion, however, if applied to the hiring of priests
by the Roman Catholic Church. Because Catholic doctrine per-
mits only males to serve as priests, an anti-discrimination law
applied to the Catholic Church would require the Church to
prove in court that gender is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion for priesthood.6 The court would be forced to decide
whether this religious tenet is actually necessary for the Church
to carry out its goals.
Historic preservation laws are also generally applicable laws
that are not aimed at religion, but which can have the effect of
preventing churches from making religiously significant
changes to their places of worship. In 1990, for example, au-
thorities in Boston prohibited a Jesuit church located in that
5. As actually applied, this standard does not provide as much protection for reli-
gion as the wording might suggest. The last major free exercise victory was Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). After Yoder, whenever the Supreme Court applied the
compelling interest test to any case not governed by clear precedent, it found either
that the free exercise right was not burdened or that the governmental interest was
compelling. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (rejecting a free
exercise challenge to income tax provisions said to deter adherents from engaging in
certain church-related activities); Susan & Tony Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor,
471 U.S. 290 (1985) (upholding minimum wage laws against a free exercise challenge);
BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding the application of tax
regulations preventing racial discrimination in the educational context against a free
exercise challenge); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (granting no relief to an
Amish employer who failed, for religious reasons, to contribute to the social security
tax system).
6. Section 703(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits gender-based
classifications only "where ... sex ... is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988). This exception to Title VII's anti-discrimination provi-
sions was "meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination .... Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
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city from rearranging its sanctuary.7 Under the law, the church
would be forced to justify its desire to make the changes, and
secular authorities would analyze complex theological argu-
ments to determine if the reasons for the changes outweigh the
city's reasons for objecting to them.
Religious teachings proscribing certain types of clothing
have also come into conflict with generally applicable laws. Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration regulations re-
quire people who work on construction sites to wear hard
hats,' but for both the Amish and the Sikhs doing so would be
inconsistent with their religious beliefs. Strict enforcement of
the law would mean that Amish and Sikhs could not be em-
ployed in the construction industry. Similarly, many public
schools require students to wear certain types of clothing to
gym classes. Under Moslem and Hindu teaching, however, the
required dress may be considered immodest for girls.
When these issues have actually arisen, courts or the authori-
ties enforcing the rules have usually made accommodations for
the religious minorities. 9 For example, where required gym
uniforms violate a certain religious group's teachings, the girls
would either be allowed to wear a different form of dress or
would be excused from class. Such accommodations were con-
sistent with and arguably required by the Supreme Court's rul-
ings on the subject of religious liberty up until last year's
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith. 10
In Smith, the Court departed sharply from its precedent in
the religious liberty area by rejecting the compelling-interest
test. The Court held that, except in a few nebulously defined
cases, the government is not required to make exceptions from
a generally applicable law for religious groups whose free exer-
7. See Society ofJesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
The Jesuits sought to change the design of the altar and add pastoral counseling rooms
nearby. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck down the
landmark commission's action under the state constitution. See id. at 571.
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.100(a)(1991) provides that "[e]mployees working in areas where
there is a possible danger of head injury from impact, or from falling or flying objects,
or from electrical shock and burns, shall be protected by protective helmets."
9. See Rayburn v. Grand Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1985) (holding that the hiring of clergy cannot be
subjected to Title VII); OSHA Instruction STD 1-6.3 (Oct. 30, 1978), revoked by OSHA
Notice CPL 2 (Nov. 5, 1990) (allowing religious exemption to hard hat rule).
10. 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
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cise is burdened by the law. 1 Though the Court explicitly af-
firmed the power of the legislature to accommodate burdened
religious groups, it held that such accommodations are not re-
quired by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 2
From a policy perspective, the argument in favor of accom-
modating burdened religious groups is compelling. Given the
tremendous diversity of the United States and the extent of
government regulation, it is not surprising that well-inten-
tioned, broadly-applicable legislation often conflicts, some-
times severely, with the religious beliefs of certain groups of
people. Given our society's dedication to religious toleration
and pluralism, it makes sense to create exceptions for those
groups whenever that can be reasonably done. Asking that laws
be written and enforced in such a way so that they do not con-
flict with people's fundamental religious beliefs is not a particu-
larly radical request. As is suggested by the examples given
above, in most cases religious beliefs can be accommodated
with little effort and without creating any severe problems.
The more difficult question is whether the First Amendment
actually requires accommodations in the types of cases discussed
above. Although the policy argument for allowing accommoda-
tions in these cases is fairly straightforward, the constitutional
argument is more complex. Several reasons, however, support
the belief that the Constitution requires accommodations and
that the Court misinterpreted the First Amendment in Smith.
The first reason can be found by studying the language of the
Constitution itself. The First Amendment provides that Con-
gress-which after incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment means government in general -"shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof....,, 4 This text appears to create more
than a mere directive against discrimination. The Clause does
not say that the government may not single out religion, nor
that the government may not discriminate against an individual
on the basis of religion. It seems to create a substantive right to
the free exercise of religion, rather than a mere guarantee of
equal treatment.
11. See id. at 1603.
12. See id. at 1606.
13. See supra note 1.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Although it is possible to read "prohibiting the free exercise
of religion" to mean "directed to" or "singling out," that is not
the most natural way of reading the text. An analogy can be
made to a situation involving a zoning ordinance that requires
that a particular area be restricted to residential uses. If a client
asks a lawyer, "Am I prohibited from operating an ice cream
store in this area?", the lawyer would read the ordinance and
most likely reply: "Yes, the ordinance does prohibit ice cream
stores." It would not matter that the ordinance was not directed
at ice cream stores or that the drafters of the zoning ordinance
never thought about ice cream stores; the ordinance, by creating
a residential zone, prohibits ice cream stores. The crucial issue
in free exercise cases is not whether the legislature was con-
cerned with or thought about religion when it enacted a stat-
ute, but whether the law in fact prohibits a religious practice.
Moreover, a broad construction of the language of the First
Amendment represents the better of two plausible understand-
ings of neutrality toward religion. The narrower view, facial
neutrality, simply prevents governmental hostility towards reli-
gion. Although that alone is an important constitutional pro-
tection that is not respected by every nation,15 the broader
interpretation treats the First Amendment as a true limitation
on governmental power. The First Amendment is more than a
safeguard against manipulation or abuse; it is a prohibition
against the exercise of governmental power in an area that
Americans historically have believed should be reserved to the
individual conscience. From the point of view of religious be-
lievers, it does not really matter whether a law is directed at
them; the injury to their religious practice is the same regard-
less of the legislators' motivation. If constitutional provisions
such as the Free Exercise Clause are viewed as limiting govern-
mental power, the broader interpretation is the better one.
A broad interpretation of the First Amendment is also sup-
ported, although not unequivocally, by the historical evidence.
The Free Exercise Clause was patterned after the various free
exercise and freedom of conscience provisions in then-existing
state constitutions.16 At the time of the ratification of the Bill of
15. For example, only recently has Mexico permitted churches to own property or to
run schools. See Tim Golden, Mexico Ending Church Restraints After 70 Years of Official Hos-
tility, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at Al.
16. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. LVI (1777).
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Rights, twelve of the thirteen states had such provisions.1 7 Of
those twelve, nine either explicitly or implicitly expressed the
following belief: The free exercise of religion is protected un-
less it endangers the public's peace and safety.18 The exact
wording varied from state to state, but the basic point of such
statutes was the same. This formulation was a precursor to the
compelling-interest test and implies that the free exercise of
religion was understood to include an exemption from gener-
ally applicable laws. If the Clause were merely intended to pre-
vent hostility toward religions, and (therefore) religious
believers were required to follow all generally applicable laws,
no peace and safety provisos would be necessary. Only where
the right to the free exercise of religion creates an exemption
from following general laws is it necessary to limit that right by
prohibiting disruptions of the peace and safety of the state.
When religious conscience came into conflict with a gener-
ally applicable law prior to the enactment of the First Amend-
ment, it was not unusual for the colonies and the states to allow
exemptions from these laws. 19 The most notable accommoda-
tion occurred when the Continental Congress created an ex-
emption from military conscription for adherents to faiths that
forbade participation in war.20
Finally, the Free Exercise Clause should be given a broad
reading because a narrow reading gives a decided advantage to
"majority" religions, that is, religions that have a substantial
number of followers or which for some other reason command
a great deal of respect in society. 21 These religions, because
17. The one exception, Connecticut, was an exception only because it had not re-
vised its constitution and was operating under a royal charter granted in the 1640s. See
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 276-78
(1969).
18. Article LVI of Georgia's 1777 Constitution is typical: "All persons whatever shall
have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and
safety of the State." I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAws OF THE UNITED STATES 383 (Ben P. Poore ed., Gov't Printing
Office, 2d ed. 1878).
19. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Original Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1466-73 (1990).
20. The Congress's resolution stated: "As there are some people, who, from reli-
gious principles, cannot bear arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to
their consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this
time of universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren in the several colo-
nies, and to do all other services to their oppressed Country, which they can consist-
ently with their religious principles." Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS at 187, 189 (1905).
21. Interestingly, the Court in Smith acknowledges that this will be one result of its
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their numbers give them substantial political influence, will be
able to enter and win protection in the political arena. In addi-
tion, their members are often involved in the drafting of legis-
lation, and they generally design the laws (consciously or
unconsciously) in light of their religious mores. The religions
that suffer under the narrow interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause are the unpopular, the unknown, and the unconven-
tional. If we believe that the principle of freedom of religion
exists to ensure that different manifestations of conscience are
to be treated equally, a broad interpretation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause is preferable.
If the Supreme Court was wrong to narrow the protections
for religious exercise in Smith, the next question must be
whether it is proper for Congress to enact a statutory remedy.
A broad-based coalition in Congress has proposed a so-called
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,2 2 which would create a
statutory cause of action for interferences with religious exer-
cise under the legal standard that prevailed before Smith, the
compelling-interest test.
Under a broad interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause,
the power of Congress to require religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws is not controversial. If citizens have
the right to practice their religion subject only to the govern-
ment's overriding need to protect peace and safety, then Con-
gress can use Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce that right.23 A federal law requiring state and local gov-
ernments to accommodate religion would be a straightforward
application of Congressional powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Difficulties with such Congressional action arise only if the
Supreme Court, when confronted with such a law, adheres to
the narrow interpretation of the First Amendment it developed
decision, but states that it is an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government"
and "must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself." 110
S.Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
22. See H.R. No. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced by Congressman
Stephen Solarz).
23. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens- of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section Five of that Amendment
broadly empowers the Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
No. 1]
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in Smith. If citizens do not have an inherent right to have their
religious beliefs accommodated, then the power of Congress to
make such a law is less clear. Under the Smith interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause, the extent of Congressional power
becomes a critical issue. If the courts will not give broad pro-
tection to the freedom of religion, Congress may be called
upon to do so.
As discussed earlier, there are strong policy arguments in
favor of protecting free exercise rights. A civilized, tolerant,
and pluralistic society should strive to protect the rights of reli-
gious minorities to the fullest extent possible. If these minori-
ties cannot get such protection through the courts, then
Congress may be the institution best suited for providing that
protection. The question that such Congressional action raises,
however, is whether this would overstep the bounds of Con-
gressional authority and usurp the power of the judiciary and
the States. Determining whether Congress has the power to
protect free exercise rights requires an examination of both
separation of powers doctrine and the meaning of Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In one sense, Congressional action is even more appropriate
than judicial action. One plausible argument against the broad
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is that it invests the
courts with the power to weigh constitutional interests against
other governmental interests without any guidance from the
legislature or constitutional warrant. When unelected judges
take it upon themselves to overturn the decisions of represen-
tative bodies without objective criteria for judgment, they ap-
pear to exceed the bounds of the judicial function.
When Congress is making laws to protect religious liberty,
the problem ofjudicial authority is eliminated. There is no fear
of power being seized by unrepresentative and unaccountable
judges. Instead, Congress, the representative branch of gov-
ernment, is taking the initiative and advancing an activist inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This activism may
give rise to federalism concerns, but given the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, those concerns should not be an im-
pediment to Congressional action.
The Fourteenth Amendment was understood and intended
to nationalize the issues of race and of the privileges and immu-
[Vol. 15
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nities of citizenship. 24 Initially these matters were left to the
States, but in the years leading up to the Civil War it became
apparent that the States were not as protective of the interests
and liberties of their citizens as our Founding Fathers had pre-
dicted. Therefore, these issues were federalized by the Recon-
struction Amendments. 25
What is often forgotten, in what has become a judge-cen-
tered view of constitutional law, is that Congress was under-
stood to be the branch of the federal government most
immediately responsible for protecting the rights arising out of
those Amendments. The original drafts of the Fourteenth
Amendment began differently than the current version does.
They began by stating "Congress shall have the power to
S. ."26 and then proceeded to address the matter at hand. In
one of the first interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court in Ex parte Virginia27 said that the effect of
the Fourteenth Amendment was not to enlarge the power of
the judiciary but to enlarge the power of Congress. 28 The vari-
ous Reconstruction Congresses took a similar view of the
Amendment. In a series of civil rights acts, Congress delineated
the privileges and immunities of citizenship. 29 Senator Charles
Sumner, the quintessential Reconstruction Era legal theorist of
the Congress, followed the strategy of beginning with non-con-
24. The Fourteenth Amendment's "main purpose doubtless was, as has often been
recognized by this court, to establish the citizenship of free negroes, which had been
denied in the opinion delivered by ChiefJustice Taney in Dred Scott... ; and to put it
beyond doubt that all blacks, as well as whites, born or naturalized within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, are citizens of the United States." United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898). See also Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) (con-
cluding that a "[s]tate cannot abridge privileges of a citizen of the United States, even
though he is a resident of a state which undertakes to do so."); Baldwin v. Franks, 120
U.S. 690 (1887) (determining that "[i]n the Constitution... the word 'citizen' is gener-
ally, if not always, used in a political sense, to designate one who has the rights and
privileges of a citizen ... of the United States, and it is so used in this clause.").
25. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery in the United States and any place
subject to its jurisdiction, and empowering Congress to enforce its provisions with ap-
propriate legislation); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ensuring due process and equal pro-
tection of the laws to all United States citizens regardless of state residence, and
empowering Congress to enforce its provisions with appropriate legislation); U.S.
CoNs'r. amend. XV (ensuring to all United States citizens the right to vote regardless of
race or color).
26. See WiLUAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 49 (1988).
27. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
28. See id. at 345.
29. See Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Civil Rights Act of
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 433 (1870); Civil Rights Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16
Stat. 433 (1871); Civil Rights Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Civil
Rights Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
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troversial rights (to own and sell property, sue and be sued, to
make contracts, and so forth) and then expanding them to pro-
tect other rights by federal law as it became politically feasible.
As demonstrated by the debates over these Acts of Congress,
he believed that he was using the Congressional forum to de-
cide the privileges and immunities of citizenship. 30
The Reconstruction Congresses did not pay much attention
to the issue of free exercise of religion, but that does not pre-
vent today's Congress from taking action. To the extent that
Congress passes laws that protect the religious liberties of citi-
zens, it is performing precisely the constitutional function that
it was expected to perform under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, it may be a positive development for this country if
Congress began to take seriously its responsibility and author-
ity to enforce the Constitution, rather than continuing to leave
that duty to an unrepresentative and unaccountable group of
nine.
30. See generally, ALFRED AvINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES (1967).
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